Religious capital and religious participation in New Eastern Europe

Abstract

The article will introduce current definitions of social and religious capital, examples of how this concept can be applied in the investigation of religious commitment and religious participation. According to the theory of social capital by J.Coleman, R.Putnam and P.Bourdieu, religious participation has direct influence on: membership in correspondent religious organizations, the activity of which is spread out over the area civil society and where the effect of religious involvement is the most powerful; affiliation to wider range of non-religious civil organizations and associations. The authors try to identify the relationship between religious participation and civil activity in NEE and EU’s countries. The investigation employs of European Values Survey (2008) and World Value Survey dates (2005, 2008). The results indicate the weak correlation between religious participation and affiliation to wider range of non-religious civil organizations and associations in Ukraine, Russia and Moldavia.

Religious capital as a symbolic resource of legitimation is also considered in the article in the perspective of religious schisms with the focus on the mechanisms of reconstruction of the religious field. Religious capital as a tool of mobilization of different social groups is a desirable resource for political powers. This perspective is adopted for the investigation of the religious capital production in the situation of the religious schisms in the NEE countries.

Keywords:
social capital, religious capital, religious participation, religious schism, field of religion, civil society, civil associations

Introduction

The varieties of religious phenomena within different cultural areas, as well as continuous advent of new forms of religious life have actualized the whole range of issues as part of social science. Ambiguities of processes in religious sphere became the occasion of heated discussions among religion researchers in regard to reconsideration of previously established conceptions about secularization and the interrelation of religious and secular issues. As G.Davie points out “modern social science of religion in the West needs new conceptual instruments that would help in better understanding of variable modern world and place which religion occupies” (Davie, 2004: 73-84). The majority of researchers agree on that fact that religious situation in countries of Western Europe differs; on the one hand it differs in processes of individualization and deinstitutionalization of religion, from the other hand it differs in acceptance by traditional church and religious organization of place in institutional system of civil society (Willaieme, 2004).

Religion continues to be the integral element of public sphere of European societies regardless the secular character of their majority. The process of renationalization of religion leads to more active involving of religious aspect into wide context of public discourse within the constraints of civil society. The result of such «renationalization can be dual process of
repoliticization of private religion and moral sphere as well as establishment of norms in economic and politic spheres» (Casanova, 1994:13). Therefore, the main research point (Casanova, 1994, 2004; Inglehart, 2004; Barker, 1999; Berger, 2003) is placed on revelation of interrelation between religion and institutions of civil society, level of participation in religious organizations and level of civil engagement in societies with different religious traditions. In such case the theoretical assumption, foremost, is the historical role played by religious organizations during the establishment and development of civil society institutions in countries of Western Europe and the USA. At the same time one question still remains undetermined – to what extent the processes of individualization and deinstitutionalization of religion influenced the civil society institutions and the level of civil engagement. In this setting, the attempt to understanding the outlined problematic became the conception of social and also its derivative conception of religious and spiritual capital that take more and more popular position as part of social science.

The involvement of the post-Soviet society in the world-wide globalization and orientation to the Western value system actualize the necessity of adequate understanding the processes in the religious sphere. The experience of the Western sociologists of religion, their viewpoints on the role and place of religion in the modern society take on significance in this context. On the one hand, this is explained by the almost complete lack of the corresponding concepts and theories within domestic scientific field; on the other hand, this is due to the fact that Western society faced the vast majority of phenomena and processes specific to the current development of religion much earlier than the former Soviet Union.

**Theoretical framework: defining social and religious capital**

The definition «social capital» obtained its popularity in the exegesis by J.Coleman; according to Coleman «social capital» is the potential of mutual trust and aid that is formed during interpersonal relations: obligations and expectations, data channels and social norms. Social capital is comprised in such elements of social organization as social networks, social norms and trust; they create the conditions for coordination and cooperation for the sake of mutual benefit. «Social capital – is the ability of individuals to dispose limited resources on the base of their membership in particular social network or wider social structure... The ability to accumulate social capital is not the individual personality characteristic; it is the peculiarity of that network of relations that individual establishes himself. Therefore, social capital is a result of person’s engagement into the social structure» (Coleman, 2000).

P.Bourdieu defined social capital as the sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition (Bourdieu and Wacquaint 1992:119).

The conception of social capital obtained further development in studies of American researcher R.Putnam. According to R.Putnam, social networks are the initial structural element of social capital reproduction. The networks of social engagement, including interest groups, volunteer organizations and civil associations encourage the transformations of intersocial trust into trust to political and civil institutions. «Social capital, – writes R.Putnam, – embodied in norms and networks of social engagement, is much more likely the precondition for economic exuberance as well as effective autonomy» (Putnam, 2000:19). Civil society directly stimulates the production of social capital (social networks and cultural norms) which, in its turn simplifies the participation in political life of society.
Analyzing the properties of social capital, its ways and form of appearance, different authors emphasize different aspects: social intercourse within one group, social intercourse between separate social groups or social intercourse as within one group or beyond.

As J.Casanova admits, participation of the religious groups in the contemporary society’s public sphere should be analyzed on three levels: level of state, level of political system and civil society (Casanova, 1994:26). According to such logic the concept of “religious capital” is considered in this article in its connection with the public sphere of the NEE countries and also with the level of civil participation.

On the societal level religious capital exist as a «grand narrative» – a source of symbols and meanings for legitimization of particular political practices. Such resource has a significant value also outside the field of religion, important for political agents which participate in symbolic struggle for the definitions of social reality. The forms of participation in public discourse adopted by different religious organizations necessitate the usage of such concepts as the “convergence of religious capitals”. The convergence of religious capitals into economic ones can take a form of usage of the cultural-symbolic resources of a particular religious tradition in the strategies of cultural development and - more directly – the forms of commercialization of religious practices and formation of a religious services market.

On the level of organizations and individual practices religious capital is considered as a capital of participation and interpersonal trust. Following Patnam’s tradition the investigation will focus on the relationship between religious and civil participation and the nexus of the level of civil involvement (associated partnership) and membership in different religious organizations. The countries with the dominant Orthodox tradition constitute the main source of data for the current analysis.

Religious capitals and religious fields: institutional level

It should be noted that in addition to the conceptualization of religious capital as the resource of organizational belonging and ability of individuals to use the religious nets of contacts (religious capital here is understood as an aspect of social capital), there is another way to religious capital provided by P. Bourdieu. He presents religious capital as part of symbolic capital thus deeming it to be a stake in the competition for power. This conceptualization appears to be more adequate for the analysis of the processes which are happening on the societal level in the New Eastern Europe countries.

Bourdieu argues that religious capital is «the generative basis of all thoughts perceptions, and actions conforming with the norms of a religious representation of the natural and supernatural world» can be mobilized by various religious claimants (religious specialists in Weber’s terms) that have the power to modify the habituses of laypersons depending on their place in the structure of distribution of religious capital (Bourdieu, 1991:22). What is even more important is that in Bourdieu’s view, religious capital is adjusted to the principles of a political vision (Bourdieu, 1991:22). Thus religious capital allows religious actors to enforce their political views through religious habitus.

In addition to this, Bourdieu also points out the following. Religious capital depends of the relations between religious demand of the population and religious supply of the individual or organizational claimants. Thus religious capital that also can be a basis of potential or real power over the laypersons and its amount depends on the force of the groups and classes that can be mobilized according to their «religious interests».
This approach allows investigating of how religious capital is used in the struggle for authority in a specific situation of the Orthodox Church schisms as rather salient cases. On that basis it’s possible to argue that in order to increase the level of their religious capital religious specialists apply different strategies and try to meet the expectations of the population. In its turn this entails politicization of religious life and in some cases the reorientation of Orthodoxy towards the projects of national state building (nationalization of the Orthodox Church). Based on this approach it seems plausible to analyze the religious schisms in the close connection with political and social cleavages.

**Challenges in reconstruction of the religious institutions in the post-socialist period: the Orthodox schisms in Ukraine, Moldova and Bulgaria**

An investigation of religious processes in the New Eastern Europe presupposes developing a particular scientific sensibility for the specific features of these countries namely their Soviet past, low level economic development and modernization. But the background of the differences between Eastern and Western Europe is hidden much deeper in particular historical, political, cultural and religious circumstances. The Constantinople model of Orthodoxy with its specific state-church relations pattern as a symphony (or a consensus) contributed to the creation of modern civilization borders between Western and Eastern European traditions (Tomka, 2006: 255). In modern situation, while still dealing with the after-effects of the Soviet policy, the former Socialist countries are on their way to political and social transformation, adopting liberal values, democratic norms and freedoms. In this process they are searching for the possibilities to combine these transformations with national and religious revival. This initiates pursuing for possible models of church-state relations based on democratic legislation.

The close connection between church and state, rooted deeply in the history of Eastern Christianity, brings attention of the researcher to the formation of alliances between organized religion and organized power in the process of religious institutions transformation. In these conditions such collaboration is supposed to be mutually beneficial as the state receives ecclesiastic legitimacy and ideological background supporting its integrity and the Church obtains the official support of the government and thus the ability to influence the society through other social institutions (education, holidays, army, prison and other). In the modern situation of the competition between different religious denominations this partnership with the state comes as a critically important for Orthodoxy to maintain its dominant status as a traditional religion. In this particular historical and political situation governmental interference in the church affairs was justified by the high purpose of preserving national identity by means of East Orthodoxy with its national and even nationalistic inclination after the epoch of militant atheism (Віллем, 2006:90).

This serves as prerequisite for the following analysis of religious institutions reconstruction processes in connection to the aspect of political influence with the main focus on the counties with the Orthodox schismatic cleavages occurred in post-socialist period, more exactly in 1992. The case study at hand involves 3 post-socialist countries (Bulgaria, Ukraine and Moldova) in which Orthodox Church has been traditionally widespread and has played an important role in historic and modern perspective.

**Bulgaria.** In May 1992 the head of the Bulgarian democratic government Philip Dimitrov questioned the legitimacy of Patriarch Maxim’s elections for the head of the Orthodox Church. He initiated the appointment of the Alternative Synod that practically laid the foundation for the
schism in the Bulgarian Orthodoxy. It is important to note that the emergence and major periods of activity of the Alternative Synod coincided with the rule of UDF (United Democratic Force) government in 1990-s.

Important changes came with the parliament elections of 2001. The former monarch Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotta (Tzar Simeon II, 1943–46) elected as a prime minister in 2001 strongly supported Patriarch Maxim. His government took an active role in adoption of the new Law on Religions (2002), which granted Patriarch Maxim exclusive legitimacy (Hajdinjak, 2004). Affirming the equality of religions and the freedom of conscience declared in the Constitution, the new Law stated the Eastern Orthodox Church as a traditional religion in the Republic of Bulgaria. It was also mentioned that the Orthodox Church is the one that is “led by the Holy Synod and is represented by the Bulgarian Patriarchy who is metropolitan bishop of Sofia” (European Yearbook 2002/2003: 665)

The peak of the schism resolving in Bulgaria came on July 21, 2004, when the police stormed 250 churches affiliated with the Alternative Synod and detained its clergy. The purpose was to restore the Bulgarian Church control over these sanctuaries (Donev, 2005:11-12). This action caused a wave of indignation from different organisations but as it turned out the schism devoid of material basis started to decrease: by March 2005 over 40 of 60 schismatic priests returned to the BOC. On the beginning of 2009 in Bulgaria only 12 active churches of Alternative Synod existed.

**Ukraine.** After the proclamation of independence the new president L. Kravchuk took the course towards separation from Russia and supported metropolitan bishop Philaret in his struggle against Russian Orthodox Church influence in Ukraine. In June 1992 Philaret proclaimed the creation of the Kiev Patriarchate. This act was confirmed by the Ministry of Justice. After the death of the first Patriarch of KP Vladimir in 1995 Philaret himself was elected as a Patriarch of Ukraine. Expressing his commitment to the idea of Autocephaly Kravchuk acknowledged the new-born Kiev Patriarchate as the legal successor of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Soviet period, and made an attempt to receive support from the Constantinople Patriarch. Nevertheless the Kyiv Patriarchate remained unrecognized by the world Orthodoxy. It has been recognized only by the Bulgarian Alternative Synod.

In contrast to Bulgaria Ukrainian situation remains unresolved yet. The position of the government before the election of 2010 may be characterized as balancing between Orthodox communities without giving an apparent preference to one and constant attempts to reunite the Church. Moreover, the state powers could hardly afford to choose a side in the conflict because it would further contribute to the widening and deepening of the already existing political and cultural gap between eastern and western regions of Ukraine where one of the confessions has a strong support. The first months after the presidential elections (2010) have showed some apparent changes in the religious policy employed by the new government. The main attention was paid by the new president to one of Orthodox churches – Moscow Patriarchate – that was also reflected in strengthening connections with Patriarch Cyril. Although no open discrimination or any decisive measures (as it happened in Bulgaria) towards the schismatic confessions have been undertaken, nevertheless one may observe an obvious yet completely expected inclination of the current government to work with the Orthodox Church of MP as the only representative of the Orthodoxy in Ukraine though the number of the KP followers is almost equal to MP (according to ISSP 2008 MP – 23, 2% from all Orthodox Christians, KP – 23,5%) according to ISSP data 2008 or a wider gap in the number of followers according to the

Moldova. The Church schism in Moldova takes its roots in the historical fragmentation of the state territory. After 1991 Bishop of Balti Petru Paduraru organized a pro-Romanian movement with the purpose to restore the Bessarabian Church under the Romanian jurisdiction. This attempt resulted in the formation of the Bessarabian Orthodox Church led by the patriotically and anti-Soviet oriented clergy (September 14, 1992). But the majority of the clergy of Moldavian Orthodox Church remained under the jurisdiction of Russian Patriarchate. The newly organized Bessarabian Metropolitanate was not recognized by the Russian Orthodox Church and also didn’t receive state’s registration. From the ecclesiastical point of view this situation was canonically anomalous as Moldova became the sphere of influence of two great Orthodox Patriarchates at the same time. The state authorities didn’t remain neutral and decided to take the side of Moldavian Orthodox Church. The main argument proposed in order to explain this situation was the concern expressed by the state authorities that registration of BMC would separate the country along the ethnic lines. The director of the State Service for the Affairs of Cults explained that "Bessarabia" no longer exists that’s why BMC cannot be registered (Corle, 1997). The case with the BMC recognition became even more complicated after 1998 when the political landscape has changed dramatically and communists headed by Voronin won the parliament elections.

As for Moldova moderating the schism situation revolved around the problem of Bessarabian Metropolitanate official status. The final decision to recognize this organization and grant it the official recognition was forced by the European Court. In 2001 The European Court of Human Rights action issued with a resolution to register the BMC in other case it “would bring the country’s exclusion from the Council of Europe, which Moldova joined in 1995” (Turcescu, 2003:461). After 10 years of struggle BMP was recognized in 2002 by the government. Nevertheless some sharp questions such as the property right of the BMC remained unsolved. In the following years mutual support between the ruling Communist party and established Orthodox Church – Metropolitanate of Moldova remained visible in political and public life of Moldova (Panainte, 2006:89100). Also the quantity on the BMC organization by 2004 is 1 to 9 compared to the Orthodox Church under the Russian canonical subordination. According to the comparative statistics of the religious organizations (2004) there are 1195 organizations of the Orthodox Church (Moldova Metropolitanate) and 130 of Bessarabian Metropolitanate (Moldova Noastra, 2004).

As it was mentioned before, in all three cases there were obvious connections between the foundation of the schism Churches and the position of the political powers, more particular – pro-democratic parties and leaders. Their support to the newly created Churches is illustrated in Table 1.
Table 1. The support of schisms by political powers (countries features)

The resolving the schisms in three countries demonstrate different approaches of the governments to dealing with the Church issues and religion in general. Unlike Ukraine, the governments of Moldova and Bulgaria have chosen to openly support the official Orthodox Church and have been criticized by EU for the violation of religious freedoms of other denominations. Such an alliance can be considered as the alliance of an established church with the state against a marginal Church. Bulgaria went further to declare officially such a unity, while for the countries like Ukraine and Moldova with the hierarchical dependency on the outside authority (the Moscow Patriarchy) this doesn’t seem feasible in the short run. Their government’s policy in this sphere is more ambiguous: de jure no legally declared preferences to any religious community but de facto there is a lot of quite obvious signs that reveal the latent cooperation between a certain church and political forces in power. The situation is becoming more complicated with the quick changes in political course and consequently the preferable ecclesiastic partner after the elections.

Results

Following the logic of social transformations Bourdieu has pointed out that social change breeds religious change. This came as a prerequisite of the analysis of religious fields and religious capitals production/reproduction/diffusion of the NEE countries after the fall of SU. The appearance in the 1992 of all such structures as the Alternative Synod (Bulgaria), the Kyiv Patriarchate (Ukraine), and the Bessarabian Metropolitanate (Moldova) created the schism situation within the Orthodoxy. According to the Bourdieu’s theory this changes required specific mechanisms of religious supply. The new churches offered a different type of religious product: separation from the Soviet past when Church was under the State control, more
nationally oriented image of the Church (national language of the liturgy, independence in the terms of Church hierarchy, etc.). This was an attempt to meet the religious demand of the people and restructure the field of religion – change a status or the dominant groups within the Orthodox Church hierarchy. This attempt to create the new type of religious capital is supported in all 3 cases by the political powers of democratic and national orientation, whereas the traditional Church structures draw their support from the conservative elites. Thus the NEE countries under this investigation are characterized with more or less obvious cooperation of the religious and political structures. Such a strategy is mainly used to restructure the field of religion and politics - replace the pro-Soviet ruling leaders of both political and religious organizations.

**Religious capital: organizational and individual level**

Supplement to ideas of social capital as an assemblage of social intercourse and cultural norms to religious sphere was the conception of religious and spiritual capital on individual and organizational level. In the book «Bowling Alone: The collapse and revival of American community» R.Putnam emphasizes the role that play religious organizations in life of American civil society. Following M.Weber, American social scientist points out that religious community acted as special repository of social capital in America. Religious participation is considered as one of the Central American communities; they are based on religious faith and have direct influence on civil engagement through the creation of social support networks for their members, breeding of moral values and civil liability. The range of researches has proved the thesis about the essential role of church affiliation in stimulation of civil engagement and political participation. That is why the process of secularization considerably encouraged the «erosion» of engagement on the level of civil communities; that was manifested in decrease of number of people who participate in different civil groups, volunteer and charity movements and associations.

There are several definitions of notions of «religious capital». L.Iannaccone determines religious capital as «assemblage of skills and experience specific for this or that religion and includes religious knowledge, acquaintance with ritual practice and theological doctrines, relations of friendship and trust among the members of particular religious group» (Iannaccone, 1990:297).

R.Stark and R.Finke give the following definitions: «religious capital consists of acquirement power and level of embeddedness into this or that religious culture» (Finke, 2003). For more complete participation in particular religious group the emotional endearment and inner religious experience (that is comprised in individual biography) are required. In total the level of embeddedness, volume of knowledge and emotional endearment become investitions that in the course of time form the religious capital. The peculiarities of religious capital formation, in return, allow constructing explanatory models of religious engagement and participation.

The researchers distinguish several highlights that influence the production of social capital. Primarily, it is the differentiation between horizontal and vertical social networks. The main difference between horizontal and vertical networks is type of trust that is inherent to these network configurations (Fennema and Tillie, 2001). In vertical networks trust, necessary for cooperation, is narrowly focused on the source of authority, whereas in horizontal social networks the trust relations are reciprocal – mutual and horizontal. In return, these are horizontal structures and informal networks that have a big potential for production and accruement of
social capital. Vertical character of relations of power is inherent for such big churches as Catholicity and Orthodoxy. Whereas the horizontal character of relations is inherent to Protestant communities.

In general, taking into consideration the phenomenon of religious capital as the variation of social capital, the majority of social scientists point out those religious organizations in modern society can be considered as communicative networks that greatly influence the character of civil engagement (Willaime, 2004:26-41).

Alongside with that it is worth to emphasize that existing modern researches of social capital display the preserved differences in force and vitality of civil society within different sociocultural areas. Therefore, the researches of social capital in post-communist and developing countries disprove the existence of any simple dependence between social trust networks, development of human potential, civil society institutions and level of religious participation, as R.Inglehart emphasizes (Norris and Inglehart, 2004).

Nevertheless it is obvious that the process of secularization in most cases positively correlates with the level of economic and democratic development of state; but it is undetermined whether this process influences the destruction of religious organizations (charity and youth organizations) as it could be expected, and whether the decrease in religious participation could be the reason for membership decrease in civil groups and associations in general. The process of religion renationalization that was mentioned above is evolutional process on the basis of thesis in J.Casanova theory. Eastern Europe, which almost for one century became expelled from Europe-wide context, faces the rightful question – to what extent the notions of «secularization» and «renationalization» of religion could be applicable to its realities?

Concerning the question about place and role of religion in post-communist countries of Eastern Europe, it is worth to mention that majority of authors emphasize weakness and imperfection of civil institutions of these communities. Among the distinctive features of letter there can be distinguished low level of intersocial trust as well as trust to public institutions; prevalence of informal social networks and relations (bonding social capital); absence of motivation; financial obstacles and low level of economic development (Pichler and Wallace, 2007:423-435). The members of society rarely trust the public institutions, alongside with that, they do not try to solve their practical problems in social organizations and political parties as it are done in Western countries. The lack of social capital and its non-community undermine the level of social trust (solidarism) and working partnership.

**Examining religious capital and associational membership across NEE and EU’s countries: hypotheses**

In order to check the range of hypotheses connected formation and production of social and religious capital within this article, we will use data of two waves of comparative projects World Values Survey (2005-2008), the project European Social Survey (2008), and the data of Gallup’s World View World Poll aimed at formation of World Giving Index¹ (world index of

volunteer engagement and charity). The main emphasis will be put on the countries of post-Soviet territory; in these countries cultural outlook was formed under essential or even crucial influence of Orthodoxy (according to data of World Values Survey for year 2005. In Ukraine 87.5% of respondents identify themselves as orthodox, in Russia – 89.7%, in Moldavia – 94.3%).

According to theory of social capital by J. Coleman and R.Putnam, religious participation (that is expressed in regular religious practices – attending of church-offices, processional, etc.) has direct influence on:

- membership in correspondent religious organizations, the activity of which is spread out over the area civil society and where the effect of religious involvement is the most powerful;
- affiliation to wider range of non-religious civil organizations and associations (charity, volunteer, youth and cultural associations), which in their turn encourage the establishment and development of civil sphere acting as its integral element.

Also we will try to consider the role and place of religion in the process of establishment of civil society institutions in eastern European countries with different religious traditions. Most of the focus will be on the following question – whether the Orthodoxy is able to play analogous role as Catholicity played in Poland or Lithuania in 1990s; that is, from the one hand, to become the communicative network that he had no small part in the striving with regime and establishment of civil institutions, and from the other hand, act as a source of social capital and national identity.

On the basis of the notion of religious capital «as the level of acquirement and level of involvement in this or that religious culture» suggested by R.Stark and R.Finke as main variable while analyzing were used the visit frequency of church services, processionals and self-manifest by respondents of their religious affiliation.

**Results**

**Religious participation and civil activity in comparative perspective**

As it was mentioned above, peculiarities of religious cultures of different societies are caused by differences in styles of religious participation. In protestant Estonia we face such situation that is inherent to Scandinavian countries; such countries are characterized by low level of religious participation and self-identification, while the level of membership in religious and church organizations is rather high (Pollack, 2008). The characteristic aspect that distinguishes post-Socialist countries with prevalence of Orthodoxy (Ukraine, Russia and Moldavia) is rather high level of self-identification of church affiliation, while the level of religious participation is rather low in comparison with countries Catholicity prevails (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Belonging to particular religion or denomination/How often attend religious services apart from special occasions (once a week) (from those who belong)/ Pray (every day) (from those who belong) (data from ESS4-2008, ed.4.0)

This feature is closely related to specific character of orthodox culture. As M. Tomka points out (Tomka, 2006), Orthodoxy differs from western Christianity in the whole range of aspects, including mindset for attendance / participation. Moreover it is necessary to distinguish «practical mindsets» or «orthodox practice» from official norms, according to which weekly participation in church-offices is obligatory. On the level of daily practices this requirement remains formal because it is self-identification what is dominant in relation to practices and participation. In most cases self-reference with Orthodoxy becomes special sign of affiliation (badges of belonging) and that symbolic (cultural) capital, by means of which individual incorporates himself in society and culture, in the absence of real religious constituent part (Borowik, 2002:497-508). As Jean-Pierre Willaime points out, considering the religious situation in France, even if the individual is not church adherent, he preserves some «cultural Catholicism» which is understood in the process of socialization (Willaime, 2006). It is possible to say the same thing about «cultural Orthodoxy». However, in any case, in Ukraine and Russia Orthodoxy acts as a powerful symbolic source that is not mostly dependent on regular religious practices.

Therefore, we can observe the significant disconnection between patterns of self manifest of religious affiliation and religiosity (Figure 2) that are close to the most high in Europe and patterns of practical religiosity. Although particular disconnection between cultural and practical religiosity is quite universal and inherent to many communities, Ukrainian and Russian (and Bulgarian) dynamics displays it the most brightly. In such case it is possible to draw a parallel with what G. Davie called «believing without belonging» (Davie, 2000), although with significant stipulations how to understand “faith” and “participation”. When it is referred to self-manifested religiosity, it is necessary to take into account the variable level of practices following and the social context depending on which the intensity of religion may vary.
Absolutely, the self-declared religiousness is a powerful index of religiosity level in a country. But there are questions: (1) as far as the so-called social context strongly promotes this level, when and a level and context, and also their relationship, in every country are different? and (2) how to analyse data, if is the religiosity level so high, that covers almost all population of country practically?

Thus, there is a necessity of differentiation in group religious after the degree of included. For this purpose we will take of ESS\textsuperscript{2} data (4 wave) and will construction the typology of church involvement on the example of the societies examined by us. A corresponding variable\textsuperscript{3} is created by strengthening of church belonging of the elementary periodic visit of church, the temporal aspect of religious belonging level (according to R. Stark and R. Finke a religious capital is constructed during time, accordingly, in such context it is necessary to examine his constituents) was here taken into account also. Using the indicators of belonging to religion (present and past) and frequency of churches visit (Table 2, Appendix) that, according to J. Billiet, are relevant for different cultures, we got next results (Table 2).

\textsuperscript{2} Just in framework of this project J. Billiet construct invariant for member-countries ESS of measuring model of latent attribute «religious involvement», component indicators which are variables of «religiosity», «participation», «praying», «importance» (Billiet, 2004). And in co-authorship of Meulemann we analyze of religious diversity in Europe (Billiet, J. and Meulemann, B., 2007).

\textsuperscript{3} It is empiric educed that such variable better correlates with other variables, for example, by socially-demographic indexes.
Table 2. Typology of Religious involvement, % (ESS, 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Core</th>
<th>Modal</th>
<th>Marginal</th>
<th>Cultural</th>
<th>Non-church</th>
<th>1st gen.</th>
<th>2nd gen.</th>
<th>Irrelevant</th>
<th>No answer</th>
<th>Religiosity level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>7,5</td>
<td>8,4</td>
<td>8,1</td>
<td>44,9</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td>29,5</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26,4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>13,4</td>
<td>15,3</td>
<td>15,1</td>
<td>29,7</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>22,9</td>
<td>3,1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>53,8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>23,6</td>
<td>21,2</td>
<td>6,4</td>
<td>24,3</td>
<td>2,4</td>
<td>18,7</td>
<td>2,3</td>
<td>1,0</td>
<td>55,1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
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<td>26,2</td>
<td>10,4</td>
<td>21,8</td>
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<td>12,3</td>
<td>2,0</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>65,5</td>
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<td>20,5</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>10,0</td>
<td>0,3</td>
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<td>10,2</td>
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<td>0,4</td>
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<td>24,8</td>
<td>10,6</td>
<td>29,7</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>47,1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>70,0</td>
<td>17,0</td>
<td>2,9</td>
<td>6,2</td>
<td>1,6</td>
<td>2,1</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>92,1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the purpose of comparison in Table 2 we are presented the countries with low and high of religiosity level also – it is Estonia and Poland, accordingly, in these countries the part of culture religious differentiates substantially. Thus, in catholic Poland, where the level of both church participation and self-declaration of religiousness on the whole is high enough, percent of a culture religious insignificantly small - all 6,2%. A situation in this country has the special historical context: Church even today to act the part an important role in bureaucratic control system by the state, first of all, and in difficult moments it was distanced from this system, accepting public position, second. Alike situation is in Romania, differences in that at the same religiosity level the population of this country approximately was identically distributed between three religious groups (Core, Modal, Marginal), while polis is concentrated in the first group - Core. It means that religiousness Romanian is less steady, and, changes of religious picture are more credible.

In Estonia in a group Cultural constitute almost 45% population, and this index is fully acceptable, if to take into account the level of religiousness in a country on the whole (26,4%), and also that almost one third of population (29,5%) is indifferent to the institute of religion here already the second generation.

On the average the fourth of population of other postcommunist countries presented in Table 2 uses the religious marker. Interesting also data that in Ukraine 12,3% of non-churches people is fixed in the second generation, while in Russia such in two times anymore (22,9%), (Ukrainians were more religious, than Russians, even in a soviet period). As in the case of Romania, in Russia a religious population was also distributed between three groups - Core, Modal, Marginal, - that testifies to instability of religious participation of that half of Russians, that adds itself on the category of religious.

The case of France is presented in this table as special, as in this country is perceptible group those, who in the past, being a religioner, for today stepped back from the institute of
religion (10.6% non-churches in a first generation). Thus, by an empiric way we succeeded to distinguish from a religious capital that part symbolic (cultural), by means of that an individual inset itself in society and culture, in the absence of actual religious constituent.

In relation to existing data about affiliation and membership in religious and church organizations, it is possible to specify that this pattern in countries under consideration is extremely low among orthodox adherents (Figure 3). On this background, protestant church organizations demonstrate rather high activity, where the level of involvement in life of religious community is high due to multidivisional and flexible network structure, as well as mechanisms and methods of recruitment of new members. Therefore, in Ukraine, where the third of officially registered religious organizations (on the 1st of January 2010 – 28.8%) are protestant, the pattern of participation in religious organizations and associations, among those who attend church twice a week or at least once a week, is 76.2%; among protestants – 6.1%; among orthodox adherent (institutional network of protestant organizations differs from orthodox in high amount of multidivisional ministries, by the absence of such notion as “canonical territory”, by fixed membership and faith acceptance in age of reason). Partially it proves the above mentioned statement about the differentiation between vertical and horizontal social networks, where horizontal networks have big potential production and accruement of social capital.

As R.Inglehart mentioned, the data analysis of World Values Survey allows to claim the existence of positive correlation between visit frequency of church and participation in religious organizations and associations in countries of Western Europe (Norris and Inglehart, 2004). As it can be observed in figure (Figure 4), there is also positive relations between active/inactive membership in religious organizations and visit frequency of church services in Moldavia, Ukraine and Russia. For the entire countries presented on graphic (Table 5), dependence between the above-mentioned variables is statistically significance at the level of 0.01, here a coefficient of correlation is 0.4 for Slovenia and Ukraine, 0.3 - for Moldova and Russia, and only 0.1 - for Bulgaria and Romania (in the previous wave of research these indexes were also significance, but
only for Bulgaria a corresponding coefficient was 0.1, for Russia and Romania - 0.3, for Slovenia, Moldova and Ukraine - 0.4). So, among those who attend church services more than once a week or at least once a week, the majority of members belongs to distinguished organizations. Herewith, the attendance intensity of church services has digressive character to maximum extent in catholic Slovenia and to minimal extent in orthodox Bulgaria and Rumania.

However within the conception of R.Putnam, it is emphasized that force and cohesion of civil society is mostly caused by affiliation to groups of different spheres: labor organizations and charity associations, cultural societies and ecological movements. Religious participation in such case has a function «bridging» social capital that unites heterogeneous groups.

In general it is possible to specify rather low level of religious participation in all the countries except Slovenia. Relatively positive dynamics is observed only in religious participation in Ukraine (+8%) and in Russia (+6%) however such increase did not lead to participation increase in other civil organizations. Also it is worth to mention the significant decrease of participation level in Rumania by all the indices. Slovenia is characterized by the biggest progress in the aspect of formation of civil participation institutions; the other member-countries of European Union slightly differ from post-Soviet countries, moreover the range of indices in most cases is even higher. As exemplified by Slovenia it can be mentioned that the participation increase in civil organizations over the considered period did not lead to increase of religious participation that almost has not changed.

In Table 3 we can observe data on membership in different civil societies over a period from 1995 year to 2005. The countries under consideration can be divided into two groups. Slovenia, Rumania and Bulgaria are the members of European Union, thus it is possible to assume that the level of participation in religious organizations is higher than in countries that are not the members of European Union – Ukraine, Russia and Moldavia. Data comprise active as well as inactive members of civil organizations.

Figure 4. Active/Inactive membership of church or religious organization / Religious practice (source WVS 2005-2008)
As it was pointed by the range of authors, over the considered period there were any significant changes in civil sphere in Ukraine, Moldavia and Russia; the level of participation in general remains low in comparison with Central and Western European communities (Pichler and Wallace, 2007:423-435).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Churches</th>
<th>Charitable/ Humanitarian</th>
<th>Educational/ Arts</th>
<th>Sports/ Recreation</th>
<th>Political parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Active/Inactive membership in different type of civil associations (source WVS 2005-2008)

The low indexes «of participation» do not allow defining some substantial relationships. Nevertheless, at the level of 0,05 with values that does not exceed 0,1 after rounding off, statistically significance is dependence between frequency of church visit and participating in charitable organizations for such countries as Ukraine, Moldova, Russia, Slovenia (1995), Ukraine and Slovenia save and slightly strengthen the positions by 2008. Taking into account a weakness and underdevelopment of institute of charity and volunteering in Ukraine, this statistically fixed result can be considered as the perspective of development of corresponding civil institute.

The World Giving Index can illustrate the level of participation in charity and volunteer organizations in countries of Eastern Europe; this World Giving Index is worked out on the base of data of Gallup’s World View World Poll⁴. The majority of countries of Eastern Europe occur in lower part of rating among 153 countries.

While working out the rating as indices were taken three main questions with regard to acts of voluntary help and charity that took place over the last month: 1) whether you have subscribed to civil organizations? 2) whether you have taken part in volunteer activity? 3) whether you help strangers who need help?

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⁴ This report is primarily based upon data from Gallup’s WorldView World Poll (worldview.gallup.com) which is an ongoing research project carried out in 153 countries. In most countries surveyed 1,000 questionnaires are completed by a representative sample of individuals living in urban centers. In some large countries such as China and Russia samples of at least 2,000 are collected, while in a small number of countries, where polling is difficult, the poll covers 500 – 1,000 people but still features a representative sample.
It is worth to mention that questions on money or time granting for charity activity concerned political and religious organizations, registered charitable associations and civil societies.

The regularity becomes an appealing question according to which those post-Soviet countries with prevalence of Orthodoxy where it is specified the highest level of self-manifest of religious affiliation occupy the lowest positions in general rating among 153 countries (Figure 5). Thus Slovenia occupies 62th position, Russia – 138th, Moldavia – 100th, Belarus – 106th, Bulgaria and Rumania – 141st and 142nd, Ukraine – 150th. Among European countries the highest positions are occupied by Ireland, Switzerland and Netherlands. Ukraine and Serbia round out.

The presented data rather can be explained by the low level of social trust in post-soviet countries, than by dominant religion (Table 4).

According to data of this table Ukrainians, Moldavians, Romanians, Bulgarians, Slovenes, are not inclined to trust any state institutes. There concerns rather about the mistrust of population of Eastern Europe, first of all, to the political and power institutes, and as a result, to public organizations, action of which activated from the moment of falling the communist regime at which any public motions were strictly controlled by power. It is possible that absence of trust to such organizations is explained very insignificant of participation in them. For example, the greatest degree of trust is possessed by the institute of church (trusts him 60,8% population of Bulgaria, more than 70% - Ukraine, Moldova and Poland, 88,1% - Romania; and only 34,3% are Slovenia); also about the active/nonactive involvement to religious organizations declare 4,3% Bulgarians, 9,8% Romanian, 17% Ukrainians, 22,7% Polish, 28,7% Slovenes and 33% Moldavians. Therein the coefficient of correlation between a trust to the institute of church and participating in him is high enough - 0,5 for Ukraine and 0,4 for Moldova and Slovenia - and statistically significance at the level of 0,01; thus, participating in this institute is explained (more, than on 20% = $R^2$) by the level of trust to him in the above-mentioned countries. In
Romania and Bulgaria there is a low level of participation at the high enough level of trust, although relationship also is statistically significance (meaning 0.2 at the level of 0.01). Interestingly, that in Poland, participating in church organization is not so strongly stipulated by a trust to her, - here Poland by a greater degree alike with two previous countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confidence:</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Moldova</th>
<th>Romania</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
<th>Poland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Churches</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Press</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Unions</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>2.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Police</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice System</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>2.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Government</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>3.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>3.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Political Parties</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>3.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charitable or humanitarian organizations</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>2.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Womenrs Movement</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>2.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Environmental Protection Movement</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The European Union</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>2.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Civil Services</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>2.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scale: 1 – A great deal, 2 – Quite a lot, 3 – Not very much, 4 – None at all

**Table 4.** Confidence to States Institute (WVS, 2005)

Completely other situation with the Labour Unions, in which are on the average 7% population of Bulgaria and Romania (7,2% and 6,6% accordingly), 13,4% - in Poland, hardly more than 19% - in Moldova and 20% - in Ukraine and Slovenia. Level of trust to this organization is considerably below (Table 8) at all countries. Thus the coefficient of correlation is statistically significance at the level of 0,01 and enough perceptible - 0,3, but with a sign minus, for Ukraine and Moldova (for other countries a meaning of coefficient is hardly below 0,1-0,2). Therefore the members of this organization disbelieve in possibilities, and rather are such "on habit"(as a rule, the members of Labour Unions are members of the same labour collective, and enter into a trade union together with a reception on work). The same, negative, but unimportant correlation (0,1-0,2) is observed in case with political parties, ecological motions, volunteer and charitable organizations.

Thus, absence of faith in possibility of any public organizations and associations explains the low percentage of participating in them of citizens of Eastern Europe countries; the institute of religion use the greater percentage of trust, it did not discredit itself in "a communist" period of the examined countries, but for the construction of civil society, alas, a church does not use this capital.
A social context of every Eastern Europe country in the explanatory model of the state and role of religious organizations in them (trust to religious organizations, specific of dominant religion...) is some fragmentary cut which have concrete temporal framework. As is generally known, formation of religion institute cannot be designated by some temporal segments. Therefore the state and role of religion is study necessary in wider context - historical. At such approach it is possible also to distinguish those basic factors - economic, political, - which influenced (and influence) on the institute of church.

Conclusions

Thus the analysis of religious capital on different levels may be concluded by the following observations.

First, the concept of religious capital offered by Bourdieu allows concentrating on the religious field with particular attention to its historical development and its hierarchy structures. The amount of religious capital controlled by the groups of religious claimants allows changing the structure of the field itself. In order to increase the power in the field religious claimants may cooperate with the powerful agents of different fields, including the field of politics.

The investigation of the Orthodox cleavages in the selected NEE countries has revealed the organizational, not canonical nature of this phenomenon. The schismatic Churches aimed at producing their own religious goods that differed substantially from those produced by the official Churches. In all three cases (Moldova, Ukraine and Bulgaria) the resources of political powers were used to legitimize the religious structures. However the outcome of religious-political alliances of newly created Orthodox structures and national forces depends on the hierarchical status of the Church, level of the popularity of the Churches (character of religious demand of the population) and political capital of the forces that supported the schism organizations.

Secondly, at the organizational level according to the conception of social capital, participation networks and personal relations that are derivative from membership in religious organizations, have significant role in expansion of such organizations as well as in reinforcement of civil communities and associations in general. The considered data proved the first assumption that religious participation (defined by visit frequency of liturgies) is positively related to membership in correspondent religious organizations. When it comes to the second part of the hypothesis on the relation of religious participation and participation in non-religious civil organizations and associations, any positive dependence was determined in considered post-Soviet communities. The processes of desecularization and revival of religion with intensive churches construction, expansion of network of religious communities, during the first decade after the dissolution of the USSR did not lead to parallel network growth of civil associations and communities.

Thus fixed insignificant growth of religious and church participation in Ukraine, Russia and Moldavia is not reflected on the affiliation to wider range of non-religious civil organizations and associations. The Church, having consistent source of social trust practically does not use it, in distinction from other social institutions. Harm made by Soviet regime to religious culture, lack of flexibility in religious institutions, their conservatism act as an obstacle for recovery of religious practices on the background of concession of religion significance and growth of its role in public sphere. Herewith identification with Orthodoxy does not act as a sign of religious but cultural identity.
## Appendix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Present belonging</th>
<th>Past belonging</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core member</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-*</td>
<td>≥, than monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modal member</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-*</td>
<td>Only holyday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginal member</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-*</td>
<td>Irregular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural member</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-*</td>
<td>Never / no affirmative answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No / Don’t no</td>
<td>-**</td>
<td>Attend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unchurched (1 st gen.)</td>
<td>No / Don’t no</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unchurched (2 th gen.)</td>
<td>No / Don’t no</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant</td>
<td>No / Don’t no</td>
<td>Yes / No / Don’t no</td>
<td>Never / Don’t no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>No answer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Not applicable
** Some affirmative answer

Construction of variable «religiosity involvement»

## References

34. «Релігія і влада в україні: проблеми взаємовідносин» Інформаційно-аналітичні матеріали до Круглого столу на тему: “Державно-конфесійні відносини в Україні, їх особливості і тенденції розвитку” 8 лютого 2011р. – К., 2011.